I Introduction
The poor explanatory power of existing theories of the nominal exchange rate is most likely the major weakness of international macroeconomics. Meese and Rogo [1983] and the subsequent literature have found that a random walk predicts exchange rates better than macroeconomic models in the short run. Lyons [2001] refers to the weak explanatory power of macroeconomic fundamentals as the \ex-change rate determination puzzle".
1 This puzzle is less acute for long-run exchange rate movements, since there is extensive evidence of a much closer relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals at horizons of two to four years (e.g., see Mark [1995] ). Recent evidence from the microstructure approach to exchange rates suggests that investor heterogeneity might play a key role in explaining exchange rate uctuations. In particular, Evans and Lyons [2002a] show that most shortrun exchange rate volatility is related to order ow, which in turn is associated with investor heterogeneity. 2 Since these features are not present in existing theories, a natural suspect for the failure of current models to explain exchange rate movements is the standard hypothesis of a representative agent. The goal of this paper is to present an alternative to the representative agent model that can explain the exchange rate determination puzzle and the evidence on order ow. We introduce heterogeneous information into a standard dynamic monetary model of exchange rate determination. There is a continuum of investors who di er in two respects. First, they have symmetrically dispersed information about future macroeconomic fundamentals.
3 Second, they face di erent exchange rate risk exposure associated with non-asset income. This exposure is private information and leads to hedge trades whose aggregate is unobservable. Our main nding is that information heterogeneity disconnects the exchange rate from observed 1 See Cheung et.al. [2005] for more recent evidence. The exchange rate determination puzzle is part of a broader set of exchange rate puzzles that Obstfeld and Rogo [2001] have called the \exchange rate disconnect puzzle". This also includes the lack of feedback from the exchange rate to the macro economy and the excess volatility of exchange rates (relative to fundamentals). Hau et al. [2002] . 3 We know from extensive survey evidence that investors have di erent views about the macroeconomic outlook. There is also evidence that exchange rate expectations di er substantially across investors. See Chionis and MacDonald [2002] , Ito [1990] , Elliott and Ito [1999] , and MacDonald and Marsh [1996] .
macroeconomic fundamentals in the short run, while there is a close relationship in the long run. At the same time there is a close link between the exchange rate and order ow over all horizons. Our modeling approach integrates several strands of literature. First, it has in common with most of the existing (open economy) macro literature that we adopt a fully dynamic general equilibrium model, leading to time-invariant second moments. Second, it has in common with the noisy rational expectations literature in nance that the asset price (exchange rate) aggregates private information of individual investors, with unobserved shocks preventing average private signals from being fully revealed by the price. The latter are modeled endogenously as hedge trades in our model. 4 Third, it has in common with the microstructure literature of the foreign exchange market that private information is transmitted to the market through order ow.
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Most models in the noisy rational expectations literature and microstructure literature are static or two-period models. 6 This makes them ill-suited to address the disconnect between asset prices and fundamentals, which has a dynamic dimension since the disconnect is much stronger at short horizons. Even the few dynamic rational expectation models in the nance literature cannot be applied in our context. Wang [1993, 1994] develops an in nite horizon noisy rational expectations model with a hierarchical information structure. There are only two types of investors, one of which can fully observe the variables a ecting the equilibrium asset price. We believe that it is more appropriate to consider cases where no class of investors has superior information and where there is broader dispersion of information. Several papers make a step in this direction by examining symmetrically dispersed information in a multi-period model, but they only examine an asset with a single payo at a terminal date.
For the dynamic dimension of our paper, we rely on the important paper by Townsend [1983] . Townsend analyzed a business cycle model with symmetrically dispersed information. As is the case in our model, the solution exhibits in nitely higher order expectations (expectations of other agents' expectations). 8 We adapt
Townsend's solution procedure to our model. The only application to asset pricing we are aware of is Singleton [1987] , who applies Townsend's method to a model for government bonds with a symmetric information structure.
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Another feature of our paper is the explicit modeling of order ow in a general equilibrium model. This should help giving a theoretical structure for empirical work. We show for example how order ow precedes prices and thus conveys information. To derive order ow, we take a di erent perspective on the equilibrium mechanism. Typically, the equilibrium price of a competitive noisy rational expectation model is seen as determined by a Walrasian auctioneer. However, the equilibrium can also be interpreted as the outcome of an order-driven auction market, whereby market orders based on private information hit an outstanding limit order book. This characterization resembles the electronic trading system that nowadays dominates the interbank foreign exchange market. As is common in the theoretical literature, we de ne limit orders as orders that are conditional on public information and the (yet unknown) exchange rate. Limit orders provide liquidity to the market. Market orders take liquidity from the market and are associated with private information. Order ow is equal to net market orders. Not surprisingly, the weak relationship in the model between short-run exchange rate uctuations and publicly observed fundamentals is closely mirrored by the close 8 Subsequent contributions have been mostly technical, solving the same model as in Townsend [1983] with alternative methods. See Kasa [2000] and Sargent [1991] . Probably as a result of the technical di culty in solving these models, the macroeconomics literature has devoted relatively little attention to heterogeneous information in the last two decades. This contrasts with the 1970s where, following Lucas [1972] , there had been active research on rational expectations and heterogeneous information (e.g., see King, 1982) . Recently, information issues in the context of price rigidity have again been brought to the forefront in contributions by Woodford [2003] and Mankiw and Reis [2002] . 9 In Singleton's model there is no information dispersion about the payo structure on the assets (in this case coupons on government bonds), but there is private information about whether noise trade is transitory or persistent. The uncertainty is resolved after two periods. Hussman [1992] and Kasa et al. [2004] also study dynamic asset pricing models with in nitely higher order expectations, but do not adopt a symmetrically dispersed information structure.
relationship between exchange rate uctuations and order ow.
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The dynamic implications of the model for the relationship between the exchange rate, observed fundamentals and order ow can be understood as follows. In the short run, rational confusion plays an important role in disconnecting the exchange rate from observed fundamentals. Investors do not know whether an increase in the exchange rate is driven by an improvement in average private signals about future fundamentals or an increase in unobserved hedge trades. This implies that unobserved hedge trades have an ampli ed e ect on the exchange rate since they are confused with changes in average private signals about future fundamentals. 11 We show that a small amount of hedge trades can become the dominant source of exchange rate volatility when information is heterogeneous, while it has practically no e ect on the exchange rate when investors have common information. Moreover, our numerical simulations show that these e ects are quantitatively consistent with empirical evidence. In the long run there is a close relationship between the exchange rate, observed fundamentals and cumulative order ow. First, rational confusion gradually dissipates as investors learn more about future fundamentals. 12 The impact of unobserved hedge trades on the equilibrium price therefore gradually weakens, leading to a closer long-run relationship between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals. Second, when the fundamental has a permanent component the exchange rate and cumulative order ow are closely linked in the long run. Private information about permanent future changes in the fundamental is transmitted to 10 In recent work closely related to ours, Evans and Lyons [2004] also introduce microstructure features in a dynamic general equilibrium model in order to shed light on exchange rate puzzles. There are three important di erences in comparison to our approach. First, they adopt a quotedriven market, while we model an order-driven auction market. Second, they assume that all investors within one country have the same information, while there is asymmetric information across countries. Third, their model is not in the noisy rational expectations tradition. 11 The basic idea of rational confusion can already be found in the noisy rational expectation literature. For example, Gennotte and Leland [1990] and Romer [1993] argued that such rational confusion played a critical role in amplifying non-informational trade during the stock-market crash of October 19, 1987. 12 Another recent paper on exchange rate dynamics where learning plays an important role is Gourinchas and Tornell [2004] . In that paper, in which there is no investor heterogeneity, agents learn about the nature of interest rate shocks (transitory or persistent), but there is an irrational misperception about the second moments in interest rate forecasts that never goes away.
the market through order ow, so that order ow has a permanent e ect on the exchange rate. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model and solution method. Section III considers a special case of the model in order to develop intuition for our key results. Section IV discusses the implications of the dynamic features of the model. Section V presents numerical results based on the general dynamic model and Section VI concludes.
II A Monetary Model with Information Dispersion II.A Basic Setup
Our model contains the three basic building blocks of the standard monetary model of exchange rate determination: (i) money market equilibrium, (ii) purchasing power parity, and (iii) interest rate arbitrage. We modify the standard monetary model by assuming incomplete and dispersed information across investors. Before describing the precise information structure, we rst derive a general solution to the exchange rate under heterogeneous information, in which the exchange rate depends on higher order expectations of future macroeconomic fundamentals. This generalizes the standard equilibrium exchange rate equation that depends on common expectations of future fundamentals.
Both observable and unobservable fundamentals a ect the exchange rate. The observable fundamental is the ratio of money supplies. We assume that investors have heterogeneous information about future money supplies. The unobservable fundamental takes the form of an aggregate hedge against non-asset income in the demand for foreign exchange. This unobservable element introduces noise in the foreign exchange market in the sense that it prevents investors from inferring average expectations about future money supplies from the price.
13 This trade also a ects the risk premium in the interest rate arbitrage condition. Notice that the unobserved hedge trades are true aggregate fundamentals that drive 13 For alternative modeling of 'noise' from rational behavior, see Wang [1994] , Dow and Gorton [1995] , and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam [1992] .
the equilibrium exchange rate, but they are typically not called fundamentals by macroeconomists because they cannot be directly observed. There are two economies. They produce the same good, so that purchasing power parity holds:
Local currency prices are in logs and s t is the log of the nominal exchange rate (home per foreign currency).
There is a continuum of investors in both countries on the interval [0,1]. We assume that there are overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods and make only one investment decision. Before dying investor i passes on his or her private information to the next investor i born the following period. This myopic agent setup signi cantly simpli es the presentation, helps in providing intuition, and allows us to obtain an exact solution to the model.
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Investors in both economies can invest in four assets: money of their own country, nominal bonds of both countries with interest rates i t and i t , and a technology with xed real return r that is in in nite supply. We assume a small open-economy setting. The Home country is large and the Foreign country in nitesimally small; variables from the latter are starred. Bond market equilibrium is therefore entirely determined by investors in the large Home country, on which we will focus. We also assume that money supply in the large country is constant. It is easy to show that this implies a constant price level p t in equilibrium, so that i t = r. For ease of notation, we just assume a constant p t . Money supply in the small country is stochastic.
The wealth w 2 t , which is the same for all investors in equilibrium. We focus on equilibria where the conditional variance of next period's exchange rate is time-invariant. The hedge against nonasset income is represented by b i t = i t . We assume that the exchange rate exposure is equal to the average exposure plus an idiosyncratic term, so that b
We consider the limiting case where the variance of " i t approaches in nity, so that knowing one's own exchange rate exposure provides no information about the average exposure. This assumption is only made for convenience and our results do not qualitatively change when we assume a nite, but positive, variance of " i t . The key assumption is that the aggregate hedge component b t is unobservable. We assume that b t follows an AR(1) process:
where
). While b t is an unobserved fundamental, the assumed autoregressive process is known by all agents. 16 Here we implicitly assume that s t+1 is normally distributed. We will see in section II.D that the equilibrium exchange rate indeed has a normal distribution.
II.B Market Equilibrium and Higher Order Expectations
Since bonds are in zero net supply, market equilibrium is given by
One way to reach equilibrium is to have a Walrasian auctioneer to whom investors submit their demand schedule b i F t . We show below that the same equilibrium can also be implemented by introducing a richer microstructure in the form of an order-driven auction market.
Market equilibrium yields the following interest rate arbitrage condition:
where E t is the average rational expectation across all investors. The model is summarized by (1), (2), (3), and (6). Other than the risk premium in the interest rate arbitrage condition, associated with non-observable trade, these equations are the standard building blocks of the monetary model of exchange rate determination.
De ning the observable fundamental as f t = (m t m t ), in Appendix A we derive the following equilibrium exchange rate:
) and higher order expectations are de ned as
Thus, the exchange rate at time t depends on the fundamental at time t, the average expectation at t of the fundamental at time t + 1, the average expectation at t of the average expectation at t + 1 of the fundamental at t + 2, etc. The law of iterated expectations does not apply to average expectations. For example,
17 This is a basic feature of asset pricing under heterogeneous expectations: the expectation of other investors' expectations matters.
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In a dynamic system, this leads to the in nite regress problem, as analyzed in Townsend [1983] : as the horizon goes to in nity the dimensionality of the expectation term goes to in nity. 
II.C The Information Structure
We assume that at time t investors observe all past and current f t , while they receive private signals about f t+1 ; :::; f t+T . More precisely, we assume that investors receive one signal each period about the observable fundamental T periods ahead. For example, at time t investor i receives a signal
where " vi t is independent from f t+T and other agents' signals. 19 As usual in this context we assume that the average signal received by investors is f t+T , i.e.,
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We also assume that the observable fundamental's process is known by all agents and consider a general process:
and L is the lag operator. Since investors observe current and lagged values of the fundamental, knowing the process provides information about the fundamental at future dates.
II.D Solution Method
In order to solve the equilibrium exchange rate there is no need to compute all the higher order expectations that it depends on. The key equation used in the solution method is the interest rate arbitrage condition (6) , which captures foreign exchange market equilibrium. It only involves a rst order average market expectation. We adopt a method of undetermined coe cients, conjecturing an equilibrium exchange rate equation and then verifying that it satis es the equilibrium condition (6 We conjecture the following equilibrium exchange rate equation that depends on shocks to observable and unobservable fundamentals:
where A(L) and B(L) are in nite order polynomials in the lag operator L. The errors " iv t do not enter the exchange rate equation as they average to zero across investors. Since at time t investors observe the fundamental f t , only the innovations " f between t + 1 and t + T are unknown. Similarly shocks " b between t T and t are unknown. Exchange rates at time t T and earlier, together with knowledge of " f at time t and earlier, reveal the shocks " b at time t T and earlier.
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Investors solve a signal extraction problem for the nite number of unknown innovations. Both private signals and exchange rates from time t T + 1 to t provide information about the unknown innovations. The solution to the signal extraction problem leads to expectations at time t of the unknowns as a function of observables, which in turn can be written as a function of the innovations themselves. One can then compute the average expectation of s t+1 . Substituting the result into the interest rate arbitrage condition (6) leads to a new exchange rate equation. The coe cients of the polynomials A(L) and B(L) can then be derived by solving a xed point problem, equating the coe cients of the conjectured exchange rate equation to those in the equilibrium exchange rate equation. Although the lag polynomials are of in nite order, for lags longer than T periods the information dispersion plays no role and an analytical solution to the coe cients is feasible.
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A couple of comments about multiplicity of equilibria are in order. Models with believed that higher order expectations are also relevant in a two-sector version of the model where rms observe each other's prices without noise. Pearlman and Sargent [2005] show that the equilibrium fully reveals private information in that case. 22 Here we implicitly assume that the B(L) polynomial is invertible, which is the case when the roots of B(L) = 0 are outside the unit circle. This assumption holds for all the parameterizations of the model considered below. See Appendix B.3 for a discussion. heterogeneous information do not necessarily lead to multiple equilibria. 24 Multiple equilibria can arise when the conditional variance of next period's asset price is endogenous, as shown by McCa erty and Driskill [1980] . But that applies to both common knowledge and heterogeneous information models. In the context of our model the intuition is that a higher conditional variance of next period's exchange rate leads to a bigger impact of hedge trades on the exchange rate through the risk-premium channel, which indeed justi es the higher conditional variance. For the special case T = 1 that we discuss below analytical results can be obtained. It is easy to check in that case that for a given 2 there is a unique solution to the exchange rate equation. But when allowing for the endogeneity of 2 we nd that there are always two equilibria, a low and a high 2 equilibrium. 25 For the more general case where T > 1 we con rm numerically that there are two equilibria.
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In Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2003] we show that the high variance equilibrium is unstable. Our numerical analysis in the paper therefore always focuses on the low variance equilibrium.
II.E Order Flow
Evans and Lyons [2002a] de ne order ow as \the net of buyer-initiated and sellerinitiated orders." While each transaction involves a buyer and a seller, the sign of the transaction is determined by the initiator of the transaction. The initiator of a transaction is the trader (either buyer or seller) who acts based on new private information. In our setup this includes both private information about the future fundamental and private information that leads to hedge trades. The passive side of trade varies across models. In a quote-driven dealer market, such as modeled by Evans and Lyons [2002a] , the quoting dealer is on the passive side. The foreign exchange market has traditionally been characterized as a quote-driven multidealer market, but the recent increase in electronic trading (e.g., EBS) implies that a majority of interbank trade is done through an auction market. In that case 24 DeMarzo and Skiadas [1998] show that the well-known heterogeneous information model of Grossman [1976] has a unique equilibrium. 25 A technical appendix that is available on requests proves these points for T = 1. 26 We check this by searching over a very wide space of possible 2 . There is an equilibrium only when the conjectured 2 is equal to the conditional variance implied by the resulting exchange rate equation.
the limit orders are the passive side of transactions and provide liquidity to the market. The initiated orders are referred to as market orders that are confronted with the passive outstanding limit order book.
In the standard noisy rational expectations literature the order ow plays no role, while the asset price conveys information. But how can the price convey information when the price is unknown at the time asset demand orders are placed? This is only possible when investors submit demand f unctions that are conditional on the price. One can think of those demand functions being submitted to an implicit auctioneer, who then nds the equilibrium price.
However, there is an alternative interpretation of how the equilibrium price is set in such models, which connects more closely to the explicit auction market nature of the present foreign exchange market. Investors submit their demand functions for foreign bonds in two components, market orders (order ow) and limit orders. Limit orders depend on available public information and are conditioned on the exchange rate itself. These are passive orders that are only executed when confronted with market orders. Market orders are associated with the private information component of asset demand.
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To be more precise, let I i t be the private information set available to agent i at time t and I p t the public information set available to all investors at the time market orders are submitted. The exchange rate s t is not part of the information set at the time orders are placed, but investors can submit limit orders that are conditional on the exchange rate. After computing the expected exchange rate next period as a function of the information set and of s t , it is easy to show that there are parameters 1 , 2 and 3 such that the demand for foreign bonds can 27 One way to formalize this separation into limit and market orders is to introduce foreign exchange dealers to whom investors delegate price discovery. Dealers are simply a veil, passing on customer orders to the interdealer market, where price discovery takes place. Customers submit their demand functions to dealers through a combination of limit and market orders. Dealers can place both types of orders in the interdealer electronic auction market, but need to place the limit orders before customer orders are known. If we introduce an in nitesimal trading cost in the interdealer market that is proportional to the volume of executed trades, dealers will submit limit orders that are equal to the expected customer orders based on public information. The unexpected customer orders are associated with private information and are submitted as market orders to the interdealer market. This formalization also connects well to the existing data, which is for interdealer order ow. be rewritten as
Market orders are de ned as the pure private information component of asset demand, which is equal to
Note that we do not condition on the exchange rate s t since it is not known at the time the market orders are placed; only limit orders can be conditioned on the exchange rate. Limit order consist of the remaining component of asset demand, which depends on the exchange rate and public information. De ning
, limit orders are
The aggregate order ow is
, which is equivalent to the sum of aggregate order ow and limit orders being zero, the equilibrium exchange rate is
When demand shifts are only due to public information arrival, the order ow term is zero and executed limit orders will be zero as well. A shift in demand can therefore bring about a change in the exchange rate without any actual trade.
Only shifts in demand due to private information lead to trade. Since s t 1 is part of I p t , it follows that there are parameters 1 and 2 such that
Equation (16) is important. It breaks down changes in exchange rates associated with public information (the rst term) and private information (the second term). The two terms are orthogonal since order ow is de ned to be orthogonal to public information. This also implies that a regression of the change in the exchange rate on order ow will lead to an unbiased estimate of 2 and an unbiased measure of the contribution of order ow to exchange rate volatility. There is no simultaneity bias in such a regression. Causality runs from quantity (order ow) to price (the exchange rate), not the other way around. Order ow decisions are made before the equilibrium exchange rate is known. This di ers from the implicit auctioneer interpretation, where quantities and prices are set simultaneously by the auctioneer. We want to emphasize though that the equilibrium exchange rate is the same under these two interpretations of price setting. The explicit auction market interpretation simply has the advantage to connect more closely to existing institutions and to evidence on the relationship between order ow and exchange rate.
III Model Implications: A Special Case
In this section we examine the special case where T = 1, which has a relatively simple solution. This example is used to illustrate how information heterogeneity disconnects the exchange rate from observed macroeconomic fundamentals, while establishing a close relationship between the exchange rate and order ow. One aspect that simpli es the solution for T = 1 is that higher order expectations are the same as rst order expectations. This can be seen as follows. Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a] show that higher order expectations are equal to rst order expectations plus average expectations of future market expectational errors. For example, the second order expectation of f t+2 can be written as E 2 t f t+2 = E t f t+2 + E t (E t+1 f t+2 f t+2 ). When T = 1 investors do not expect the market to make expectational errors next period. An investor may believe at time t that he has di erent private information about f t+1 than others. However, that information is no longer relevant next period since f t+1 is observed at t + 1.
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While not critical, we make the further simplifying assumptions in this section that b t and f t are i.i.d., i.e., b = 0 and f t = " f t . Replacing higher order with rst order expectations, equation (7) then becomes:
Only the average expectation of f t+1 appears. We have replaced 
III.A Solving the Model with Heterogenous Information
When T = 1 investors receive private signals v i t about f t+1 , as in (9) . Therefore the average expectation E t f t+1 in (17) depends on the average of private signals, which is equal to f t+1 itself. This implies that the exchange rate s t depends on f t+1 , so that the exchange rate becomes itself a source of information about f t+1 . However, the exchange rate is not fully revealing as it also depends on unobserved aggregate hedge trades b t . To determine the information signal about f t+1 provided by the exchange rate we need to know the equilibrium exchange rate equation. We conjecture that
Since an investor observes f t , the signal he gets from the exchange rate can be written
where e s t = s t
1+
f t is the "adjusted" exchange rate. The variance of the error of this signal is
b . Consequently, investor i infers E i t f t+1 from three sources of information: i) the distribution of f t+1 ; ii) the signal v i t ; iii) the adjusted exchange rate (i.e., (19) ). Since errors in each of these signals have a normal distribution, the projection theorem implies that E i t f t+1 is given by a weighted average of the three signals, with the weights determined by the precision of each signal. We have:
For the exchange rate signal, the precision is complex and depends both on 2 b and b = f , the latter being endogenous. By substituting (20) into (17) and using the fact that
in computing E t f t+1 , we get:
) > 1. Equation (21) con rms the conjecture (18) . Equating the coe cients on f t+1 and b t in (21) to respectively f and b yields implicit solutions to these parameters.
We will call z the magni cation factor: the equilibrium coe cient of b t in (21) is the direct e ect of b t in (17) multiplied by z. This magni cation can be explained by rational confusion. When the exchange rate changes, investors do not know whether this is driven by hedge trades or by information about future macroeconomic fundamentals by other investors. Therefore, they always revise their expectations of fundamentals when the exchange rate changes (equation (20)). This rational confusion magni es the impact of the unobserved hedge trades on the exchange rate. More speci cally, from (17) and (20), we can see that a change in b t has two e ects on s t . First, it a ects s t directly in (17) through the risk-premium channel. Second, this direct e ect is magni ed by an increase in E t f t+1 from (20) .
The magni cation factor can be written as
The magni cation factor therefore depends on the precision of the exchange rate signal relative to the precision of the private signal. The better the quality of the exchange rate signal, the more weight is given to the exchange rate in forming expectations of f t+1 , and therefore the larger the magni cation of the unobserved hedge trades. Figure 1 shows the impact of two key parameters on magni cation. A rise in the private signal variance 
III.B Disconnect from Observed Fundamentals
In order to precisely identify the channels through which information heterogeneity disconnects the exchange rate from observed fundamentals, we now compare the model to a benchmark with identically informed investors. The benchmark we consider is the case where investors receive the same signal on future f t 's, i.e., they have incomplete but common knowledge on future fundamentals. With common knowledge all investors receive the signal
where d 1=var t (f t+1 ) = v;c + f . Substitution into (17) yields the equilibrium exchange rate:
where v = (1+ ) 2 v;c =d, and is the conditional variance of next period's exchange rate in the common knowledge model. In this case the exchange rate is fully revealing, since by observing s t investors can perfectly deduce b t . Thus, c b is equal to the direct risk-premium e ect of b t given in (17) . We can now compare the connection between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the two models. In the heterogeneous information model the observed fundamental is f t , while in the common knowledge model it also includes v t . We compare the R 2 of a regression of the exchange rate on observed fundamentals in the two models. From (18), the R 2 in the heterogeneous information model is de ned by:
From (25) the R 2 in the common knowledge model is de ned by:
If the conditional variance of the exchange rate is the same in both models the R 2 is clearly lower in the heterogeneous information model. Two factors contribute to this. First, the contribution of unobserved fundamentals to exchange rate volatility is ampli ed, as measured by the magni cation factor z in the denominator of (26) . Second, the average signal in the heterogeneous information model, which is equal to the future fundamental, is unobserved and therefore contributes to reducing the R 2 . It also appears in the denominator of (26) . In contrast, the signal about future fundamentals is observed in the common knowledge model, and therefore contributes to raising the R 2 . The variance of this signal,
;c , appears in the numerator of (27) . The conditional variance of the exchange rate also contributes to the R 2 . It can be higher in either model, dependent on assumptions about parameter values and quality of the public and private signals.
30

III.C Order Flow
It is straightforward to implement for this special case the general de nition of order ow and limit orders discussed in section II. Using (4), (18) and (20), we can write demand for foreign bonds as
Limit orders are captured by the rst term, while order ow is captured by the sum of the last two terms. Note that the variables v i t and b i t in the private information set are unpredictable by public information at the time market orders are placed.
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Aggregate order ow is then
30 While we focus here on the exchange rate determination puzzle, which is about the disconnect between exchange rates and observed fundamentals, it is easy to show that in the heterogeneous information model the exchange rate is more disconnected from fundamentals \f " generally (both observed and future fundamentals) than in the common knowledge model. In that case the term f 2 f moves from the denominator to the numerator of (26) . When the conditional variance of next period's exchange rate is the same in both models, the R 2 remains lower in the heterogeneous information model due to the ampli cation of unobserved hedge trades. 31 In terms of the notation introduced in section II, E(I Taking the aggregate of (28), imposing market equilibrium, we get
Equation (30) shows that the exchange rate is related in a simple way to a commonly observed fundamental and order ow. The order ow term captures the extent to which the exchange rate changes due to the aggregation of private information. The impact of order ow is larger the bigger the magni cation factor z. A higher level of z implies that the order ow is more informative about the future fundamental. It is easily veri ed that in the common knowledge model
In that case order ow is only driven by hedge trades. 32 Since these trades have no information content about future fundamentals, the impact of order ow on the exchange rate is smaller (not multiplied by the magni cation factor z). A comparison between (30) and (31) clearly shows that the exchange rate is more closely connected to order ow in the heterogeneous information model and more closely connected to public information in the common knowledge model.
IV Model Implications: Dynamics
In this section, we examine the more complex dynamic properties of the model when T > 1. There are two important implications. First, it creates endogenous persistence of the impact of non-observable shocks on the exchange rate. Second, higher order expectations di er from rst order expectations when T > 1. Even for T = 2 expectations of in nite order a ect the exchange rate. We show that higher order expectations tend to increase the magni cation e ect, but have an ambiguous impact on the disconnect. We now examine these two aspects in turn. 32 Note that aggregate hedge trade b t is not in the public information set at the time orders are submitted. It is only revealed after the price is known.
IV.A Persistence
When T > 1, even transitory non-observable shocks have a persistent e ect on the exchange rate. This is due to the learning of investors who gradually realize that the change in the exchange is not caused by a shock to future fundamentals. 33 The exchange rate at time t depends on future fundamentals f t+1 , f t+2 , :::,f t+T , and therefore provides information about each of these future fundamentals. A transitory unobservable shock to b t a ects the exchange rate at time t and therefore a ects the expectations of all future fundamentals up to time t + T . This rational confusion will last for T periods, until the nal one of these fundamentals, f t+T , is observed. Until that time investors will continue to give weight to s t in forming their expectations of future fundamentals, so that b t continues to a ect the exchange rate. 34 As investors gradually learn more about f t+1 , f t+2 , :::,f t+T , both by observing them and through new private signals and exchange rate signals, the impact on the exchange rate of the shock to b t gradually dissipates. The persistence of the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate is also a ected by the persistence of the shock itself. When the b-shock itself becomes more persistent, it is more di cult for investors to learn about fundamentals up to time t + T from exchange rates subsequent to time t. The rational confusion is therefore more persistent and so is the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate.
IV.B Higher Order Expectations
The topic of higher order expectations is a di cult one, but it has potentially important implications for asset pricing. Since a detailed analysis falls outside the scope of this paper, we limit ourselves to a brief discussion regarding the impact of higher order expectations on the connection between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals. We apply the results of Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a] , where we provide a general analysis of the impact of higher order expectations on 33 Persistence can also arise in models with incomplete but common knowledge, such as Mussa [1976] . When agents do not know whether an increase in an observed fundamental is transitory or persistent, a transitory shock will have a larger and more persistent e ect because of gradual learning. 34 This result is related to ndings by Brown and Jennings [1989] and Grundy and McNichols [1989] , who show in the context of two-period noisy rational expectations models that the asset price in the second period is a ected by the asset price in the rst period.
asset prices. 35 We still assume that b = 0.
Let s t denote the exchange rate that would prevail if the higher order expectations in (7) are replaced by rst order expectations. 36 In Bacchetta and van
Wincoop [2004a] we show that the present value of the di erence between higher and rst order expectations depends on average rst-order expectational errors about average private signals. In Appendix C we show that in our context this leads to
The parameters k are de ned in the Appendix and are positive in all numerical applications. Higher order expectations therefore introduce a new asset price component, which depends on average rst-order expectational errors about future fundamentals. Moreover, the expectational errors E t f t+k f t+k depend on errors in public signals, i.e., observed fundamentals and exchange rates; based on private information alone these average expectational errors would be zero. There are two types of errors in public signals. First, there are errors in the exchange rate signals that are caused by the unobserved hedge trades at time t and earlier. This implies that unobserved hedge trades receive a larger weight in the equilibrium exchange rate. The other type of errors in public signals are errors in the signals based on the process of f t . These errors depend negatively on future innovations in the fundamental, which implies that the exchange rate depends less on unobserved future fundamentals. To summarize, hedge shocks are further magni ed by the presence of higher order expectations, while the overall impact on the connection between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals is ambiguous. 37 35 Allen, Morris and Shin [2005] provide an insightful analysis of higher order expectations with an asset price, but they do not consider an in nite horizon model. 36 That is s t = 1 1+ 
V Model Implications: Numerical Analysis
We now solve the model numerically to illustrate the various implications of the model discussed above. We rst consider a benchmark parameterization and then discuss the sensitivity of the results to changing some key parameters.
V.A A Benchmark Parameterization
The parameters of the benchmark case are reported in Table 1 . We assume that the observable fundamental f follows a random walk, whose innovations have a standard deviation of f = 0:01. We assume a high standard deviation of the private signal error of v = 0:08. The unobservable fundamental b follows an AR process with autoregressive coe cient of b = 0:8 and a standard deviation b = 0:01 of innovations. Although we have made assumptions about both b and risk-aversion , they enter multiplicatively in the model, so only their product matters. Finally, we assume T = 8, so that agents obtain private signals about fundamentals eight periods before they are realized. Figure 2 shows some of the key results from the benchmark parameterization. Panels A and B show the dynamic impact on the exchange rate in response to onestandard deviation shocks in the private and common knowledge models. In the heterogeneous agent model, there are two shocks: a shock " f t+T (f -shock), which rst a ects the exchange rate at time t, and a shock " b t (b-shock). In the common knowledge model there are also shocks " v t , which a ect the exchange rate through the commonly observable fundamental v t . In order to facilitate comparison, we set the precision of the public signal such that the conditional variance of next period's exchange rate is the same as in the heterogeneous information model. This implies that the unobservable hedge trades have the same risk-premium e ect in the two models. We will show below that our key results do not depend on the assumed precision of the public signal.
Magni cation
The magni cation factor in the benchmark parameterization turns out to be substantial: 7.2. This is visualized in Figure 2 by comparing the instantaneous response of the exchange rate to the b-shocks in the two models in panels A and B. The only reason the impact of a b-shock is so much bigger in the heteroge-neous information model is the magni cation factor associated with information dispersion.
Persistence
We can see from panel A that after the initial shock the impact of the b-shocks dies down almost as a linear function of time. The half-life of the impact of the shock is 3 periods. After 8 periods the rational confusion is resolved and the impact is the same as in the public information model, which is close to zero.
The meaning of a 3-period half-life depends of course on what we mean by a period in the model. What is critical is not the length of a period, but the length of time it takes for uncertainty about future macro variables to be resolved. For example, assume that this length of time is eight months. If a period in our model is a month, then T = 8. If a period is three days, then T = 80. We nd that the half-life of the impact of the unobservable hedge shocks on the exchange rate that can be generated by the model remains virtually unchanged as we change the length of a period. For T = 8 the half life is about 3, while for T = 80 it is about 30.
38 In both cases the half-life is 3 months. Persistence is therefore driven critically by the length of time it takes for uncertainty to resolve itself. Deviations of the exchange rate from observed fundamentals can therefore be very long-lasting when it takes a long time before expectations about future fundamentals can be validated, such as expectations about the long-term technology growth rate of the economy.
Exchange rate disconnect in the short and the long run Panel C reports the contribution of unobserved hedge trades to the variance of s t+k s t at di erent horizons. In the heterogeneous information model, 70% of the variance of a 1-period change in the exchange rate is driven by the unobservable hedge trades, while in the common knowledge model it is a negligible 1.3% (such 38 When we change the length of a period we also need to change other model parameters, such as the standard deviations of the shocks. In doing so we restrict parameters such that (i) the contribution of b-shocks to var(s t+1 s t ) is the same as in the benchmark parameterization and (ii) the impact of b-shocks on exchange rate volatility remains largely driven by information dispersion (large magni cation factor). For example, when we change the benchmark parameterization such that T = 80, v = 0:26, f = 0:0016 and = 44, the half-life is 28 periods. The magni cation factor is 48. a small e ect is typical of standard portfolio-balance models). While in the shortrun unobservable fundamentals dominate exchange rate volatility, in the long-run observable fundamentals dominate. For example, the contribution of hedge trades to the variance of exchange rate changes over a 10-period interval is less than 20%. As seen in panel A, the impact of hedge trades on the exchange rate gradually dies down as rational confusion dissipates over time.
In order to determine the relationship between exchange rates and observed fundamentals, panel D reports the R 2 of a regression of s t+k s t on all current and lagged observed fundamentals. In the heterogeneous information model this includes all one period changes in the fundamental f that are known at time t + k: f t+s f t+s 1 , for s k. In the common knowledge model it also includes the corresponding one-period changes in the public signal v. The R 2 is close to 1 for all horizons in the common knowledge model, while it is much lower in the heterogeneous information model. At the one-period horizon it is only 0.14; it then rises as the horizon increases, to 0.8 for a 20-period horizon. This is consistent with extensive ndings that macroeconomic fundamentals have weak explanatory power for exchange rates in the short to medium run, starting with Meese and Rogo [1983] , and ndings of a closer relationship over longer horizons.
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Two factors account for the results in panel D. The rst is that the relative contribution of unobservable hedge shocks to exchange rate volatility is large in the short-run and small in the long-run, as illustrated in panel C. The second factor is that through private signals the exchange rate at time t is also a ected by innovations " f t+1 ; ::; " f t+T in future fundamentals that are not yet observed today. In the long-run these become observable, again contributing to a closer relationship between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the long-run.
Exchange rate and future fundamentals
Recently Engel and West [2005] and Froot and Ramadorai [2005] have reported evidence that exchange rate changes predict future fundamentals, but only weakly so. Our model is consistent with these ndings. Panel E of Figure 2 reports the R 2 of a regression f t+k f t+1 on s t+1 s t for k 2. The R 2 is positive, but is never above 0.14. The exchange rate is a ected by the private signals of future fundamentals, which aggregate to the future fundamentals. However, most of the short-run volatility of exchange rates is associated with unobservable hedge trades, which do not predict future fundamentals.
Exchange rate and order ow
Order ow is computed as discussed in section II.E. Appendix D discusses further details for the case where the fundamental f is a random walk. With x t de ned as cumulative order ow, panel F reports the R 2 of a regression of s t+k s t on x t+k x t . The R 2 is large. At a one-period horizon it is 0.84, so that 84% of the variance of one-period exchange rate changes can be accounted for by order ow as opposed to public information. The relationship between cumulative order ow and exchange rates gets even stronger as the horizon k increases, with the R 2 rising to 0.97 for k = 40. As k approaches in nity the R 2 approaches a level near 0.99, so that there is a very close long-run relationship between cumulative order ow and exchange rates.
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It is important to point out that the close relationship between the exchange rate and order ow in the long run is not inconsistent with the close relationship between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the long run. When the exchange rate rises due to private information about permanently higher future fundamentals, the information reaches the market through order ow. Eventually the future fundamentals will be observed, so that there is a link between the exchange rate and the observed fundamentals. But most of the information about higher future fundamentals is aggregated into the price through order ow. Order ow associated with information about future fundamentals has a permanent e ect on the exchange rate.
Our results can be compared to similar regressions that have been conducted based on the data. Evans and Lyons [2002a] estimate regressions of one-day ex- 40 The relationship between s t+k s t and x t+k x t does not always get stronger for longer horizons. For low values of T the R 2 declines with k and then converges asymptotically to a positive level. Appendix D shows that cumulative order ow and exchange rates are not cointegrated, which explains why the R 2 never approaches 1 as k approaches in nity. The
Appendix shows that there is a cointegrating relationship between s t , x t andb t = P 1 s=0 b t T s . Shocks to the fundamental f have a permanent a ect on both the exchange rate and cumulative order ow. Hedge trade innovations a ect cumulative order ow permanently, but their e ect on the exchange rate dies out when hedge trade shocks are temporary ( b < 1).
change rate changes on daily order ow. They nd an R 2 of 0.63 and 0.40 for respectively the DM/$ and the yen/$ exchange rate, based on four months of daily data in 1996. Evans and Lyons [2002b] report results for nine currencies. They point out that exchange rate changes for any currency pair can also be a ected by order ow for other currency pairs. Regressing exchange rate changes on order ow for all currency pairs they nd an average R 2 of 0.67 for their nine currencies.
The pictures for the exchange rate and cumulative order ow reported in Evans and Lyons [2002a] for the DM/$ and yen/$ suggest that the link is even stronger over horizons longer than one day, although their data set is too short for formal regression analysis. These pictures look very similar to their theoretical counterparts, which are reported in Figure 3 for four simulations of the model over 40 periods. 41 The simulations con rm a close link between the exchange rate and cumulative order ow at both short and long horizons.
While not reported in panel F, the R 2 of regressions of exchange rate changes on order ow in the public information model is close to zero. Two factors contribute to the much closer link between order ow and exchange rates in the heterogeneous information model. First, in the heterogenous information model both private information about future fundamentals and hedge trades contribute to order ow, while in the public information model only hedge trades contribute to order ow. Second, the impact on the exchange rate of the order ow due to hedge trades is much larger in the heterogeneous information model. The reason is that order ow is informative about future fundamentals in the heterogeneous information model. As illustrated in section III.C, the magni cation factor z applied to the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate also applies to the impact of order ow on the exchange rate.
V.B Sensitivity to Model Parameters
In this subsection, we consider the parameter sensitivity of two key moments: the R 2 of a regression of s t+1 s t on observed fundamentals at t + 1 and earlier and the R 2 of a regression of s t+1 s t on order ow x t+1 x t . These are the moments reported for k = 1 in panels D and F of Figure 2 .
41 Both the log of the exchange rate and cumulative order ow are set at zero at the start of the simulation.
A rst issue is that the precision of the public signal in the common knowledge model does not play an important role in the comparison with the heterogeneous information model. In particular, it has little in uence on the stark di erence between the two models regarding the connection between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals. Consider the R 2 of a regression of a one-period change in the exchange rate on all current and past observed fundamentals, as reported in Figure 2D . In the heterogeneous information model it is 0.14, while in the public information model it varies from 0.97 to 0.99 as we change the variance of the noise in the public signal from in nity to zero.
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We now consider sensitivity analysis to four key model parameters in the heterogeneous information model: v , b , b and T . The results are reported in Figure  4 . Not surprisingly, the two R 2 's are almost inversely related as we vary parameters. The larger the impact of order ow as a channel through which information is transmitted to the market, the smaller is the explanatory power of commonly observed macro fundamentals.
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An increase in v , implying less precise private information, reduces the link between the exchange rate and order ow and increases the link between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals. In the limit as the noise in private signals approaches in nity, the heterogeneous information model approaches the public information model (with uninformative signals).
Somewhat surprisingly, an increase in the noise originating from hedge trades, by either raising the standard deviation b or the persistence b , tends to strengthen the link between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals and reduce the link between the exchange rate and order ow. However, the e ect is relatively small due to o setting factors. Order ow becomes less informative about future fundamentals with more noisy hedge trades. This reduces the impact of order ow on the exchange rate. On the other hand, the volatility of order ow increases, 42 In Figure 2 , we have assumed that the precision of the public signal is such that the conditional variance of the exchange rate is the same in the two models. This implies a standard deviation of the error in the public signal of 0.033. 43 The two lines do not add to one. The reason is that some variables that are common knowledge are not included in the regression on observed fundamentals. These are past exchange rates and hedge demand T periods ago. Past exchange rates are not included since they are not traditional fundamentals. Hedge demand T periods ago can be indirectly derived from exchange rates T periods ago and earlier, but is not a directly observable fundamental.
which contributes positively to the R 2 for order ow. The former e ect slightly dominates. It is also worthwhile pointing out that the assumed stationarity of hedge trades in the benchmark parameterization is not responsible for the much weaker relationship between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the short-run than the long-run. Even if we assume b = 1, so that unobserved aggregate hedge trades follow a random walk as well, this nding remains largely unaltered. The R 2 for observed fundamentals rises from 0.21 for a 1-period horizon to 0.85 for a 40-period horizon. The nal panel of Figure 4 shows the impact of changing T . Initially, an increase in T leads to a closer link between order ow and the exchange rate and a weaker link between observed fundamentals and the exchange rate. The reason is that as T increases the quality of private information improves because agents have signals about fundamentals further into the future. This implies that the impact of order ow on the exchange rate increases. Moreover, order ow itself also becomes more volatile as more private information is aggregated. However, beyond a certain level of T , the link between the exchange rate and order ow is weakened when T is raised further. The reason is that the improved quality of information reduces the conditional variance 2 of next period's exchange rate.
This reduces the e ect of order ow on the exchange rate, as can be seen from (30) .
VI Conclusion
The close relationship between order ow and exchange rates, as well as the large volume of trade in the foreign exchange market, suggest that investor heterogeneity is key to understanding exchange rate dynamics. In this paper we have explored the implications of information dispersion in a simple model of exchange rate determination. We have shown that these implications are rich and that investors' heterogeneity can be an important element in explaining the behavior of exchange rates. In particular, the model can account for some important stylized facts on the relationship between exchange rates, fundamentals and order ow: (i) fundamentals have little explanatory power for short to medium run exchange rate movements, (ii) over long horizons the exchange rate is closely related to observed fundamentals, (iii) exchange rate changes are a weak predictor of future fundamentals, and (iv) the exchange rate is closely related to order ow. The paper should be considered only as a rst step in a promising line of research. While we have mostly focused on the implications of the model for the relationship between exchange rates, fundamentals and order ow, future work along this line should also consider the implications for other outstanding exchange rate puzzles such as the forward discount puzzle and excess volatility puzzle.
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More broadly speaking, a natural next step is to confront the model to the data. While the extent of information dispersion and unobservable hedge trades are not known, they both a ect order ow. Some limited data on order ow are now available and will help tie down the key model parameters. The magni cation factor may be quite large. Back-of-the-envelope calculations by Gennotte and Leland [1990] in the context of a static model for the U.S. stock market crash of October 1987 suggest that the impact of a $6 billion unobserved supply shock was magni ed by a factor 250 due to rational confusion about the source of the stock price decline. In the context of foreign exchange markets, Osler [2005] presents evidence that trades which are uninformative about future fundamentals have a large impact on the price.
There are several directions in which the model can be extended. The rst is to explicitly model nominal rigidities as in the \new open economy macro" literature. In that literature exchange rates are entirely driven by commonly observed macro fundamentals. Conclusions that have been drawn about optimal monetary and exchange rate policies are likely to be substantially revised when introducing investor heterogeneity. Another direction is to consider alternative information structures. For example, the information received by agents may di er in its quality or in its timing. There can also be heterogeneity about the knowledge of the underlying model. ing body of empirical work on order ow in the foreign exchange microstructure literature is likely to increase our understanding of the nature of the information structure, providing guidance to future modeling.
B Solution method with two-period overlapping investors
The solution method is related to Townsend (1983, section VIII). We start with the conjectured equation (11) for s t and check whether it is consistent with the model, in particular with equation (6) . For this, we need to estimate the conditional moments of s t+1 and express them as a function of the model's innovations. Finally we equate the parameters from the resulting equation to the initially conjectured equation.
B.1 The exchange rate equation
From (1)- (3), and the de nition of f t , it is easy to see that i t i t = (f t s t )= . Thus, (6) gives (for a constant 2 t ):
We want to express (36) in terms of current and past innovations. First, we 
where:
Moreover, P var t ( t ) is given by:
B.3 Solution
First, 2 can easily be derived from (39) and (43) . Second, substituting (41) and (40) into (38) , and averaging over investors, gives the average expectation in terms of innovations:
We can then substitute E t (s t+1 ) and 2 into ( 36) so that we have an expression for s t that has the same form as (11) . We then need to solve a xed point problem.
Although A(L)and B(L) are in nite lag operators, we only need to solve anitely dimensional xed point problem in the set of parameters (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a T ; b 1 ; :::; b T +1 ). This can be seen as follows. First, it is easily veri ed by equating the parameters of the conjectured and equilibrium exchange rate equation for lags T and greater
and a T +s+1 = 1+ a T +s 1 d s for s 1. Assuming non-explosive coe cients, the solutions to these di erence equations give us the coe cients for lags T + 1 and greater: and therefore the parameters of the equilibrium exchange rate equation. We use the Gauss NLSYS routine to solve the 2T + 1 non-linear equations. After having found the solution, we can also verify that the polynomial B(L) is invertible, which is necessary to extract information about hedge trade innovations at t T and earlier from exchange rates at t T and earlier. Using that
B(L) is invertible when the roots of the polynomial are outside the unit circle. Setting B(L) = 0, multiplying by 1 b L, yields
This amounts to solving the roots of an ordinary T -order polynomial, which is done with the routine polyroot in Gauss. The roots are indeed outside the unit circle for all parameterizations considered in the paper. For the benchmark parameterization the roots are (rounding to the second digit after the decimal point):
( 1:43; 1:03+0:98i; 1:03 0:98i; 0:07+1:39i; 0:07 1:39i; 0:89+0:98i; 0:89 0:98i; 1:28).
C Higher Order Expectations
We show how (32) 
De ne P V t = P 1 s=1 1+ s f t+s as the present discounted value of future observed fundamentals. Let V i t be the set of private signals available at time t that are still informative about P V t+1 at t + 1. In our application V (7), (47) and (48) then lead to (32) with =(1 + ) = ( 2 ; ::; T ) 0 .
D Order Flow
In this section we describe our measure of order ow when the observable fundamental follows a random walk. Using the notation and results from Appendix B, we have
where n = 
Using that v for s = 1; ::; T . Order ow x t x t 1 is de ned as the component of (51) that is orthogonal to public information (other than s t ). Public information that helps predict this term includes b t T and s t 1 ; ::; s t T +1 . Order ow is then the error term of a regression of . It follows that
We can also show that there is a cointegrating relationship between the exchange rate, cumulative order ow andb t = P 1 s=0 b t T s . When f follows a random walk, the equilibrium exchange rate can be written as (see Appendix B.3)
Order ow is equal to x t x t 1 = 0 t
where 0 = 0 (I M s H 0 s ). It therefore follows that cumulative order ow is equal to x t = ( 1 + :: + T )f t + ( T +1 + ::
where depends on the parameters in the vector . It follows from (53) and (55) that there is a cointegrating relationship between s t , x t andb t . Note that the latter follows a random walk sinceb t b t 1 = b t T . This cointegrating relationship holds both for b < 1 and b = 1. In the latter case b t T =b t .
Benchmark parameterization Table 1 for parameter assumptions. 
